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Privacy in the Age of Autonomous
Vehicles
Ivan L. Sucharski* & Philip Fabinger**
Abstract
To prepare for the age of the intelligent, highly connected, and
autonomous vehicle, a new approach to concepts of granting
consent, managing privacy, and dealing with the need to interact
quickly and meaningfully is needed. Additionally, in an
environment where personal data is rapidly shared with a
multitude of independent parties, there exists a need to reduce the
information asymmetry that currently exists between the user and
data collecting entities. This Article rethinks the traditional notice
and consent model in the context of real-time communication
between vehicles or vehicles and infrastructure or vehicles and
other surroundings and proposes a re-engineering of current
privacy concepts to prepare for a rapidly approaching digital
future. In this future, multiple independent actors such as vehicles
or other machines may seek personal information at a rate that
makes the traditional informed consent model untenable.
This Article proposes a two-step approach: As an attempt to
meet and balance user needs for a seamless experience while
preserving their rights to privacy, the first step is a less static
consent paradigm able to better support personal data in systems
which use machine based real-time communication and
automation. In addition, the article proposes a radical re-thinking
of the current privacy protection system by sharing the vision of
“Privacy as a Service” as a second step, which is an independently
managed method of granular technical privacy control that can
better protect individual privacy while at the same time
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I. Introduction: The Challenges of Modern Privacy Management
“Recent inventions and business methods call attention to the next
step which must be taken for the protection of the person, and for
securing to the individual . . . the right to be let alone.”1
What seems to be a statement envisaging the next innovative
step in digitization is in fact a flashback. In December 1890,
Samuel D. Warren and Louis D. Brandeis came to this conclusion
in their groundbreaking article The Right to Privacy. Triggered
by the publication in newspapers of individuals’ “instantaneous
photographs” and the corresponding effects on individual privacy,
they felt that action must be taken.2 Now, 127 years later, we are
facing machine-to-machine interactions, another type of real-time
or “instantaneous” communication that may include a privacy
payload. While trying to apply established privacy principles to
this type of communication we inevitably conclude: Market
disruption must be accompanied by a disruption in the privacy
paradigm.
Let us begin by returning to the basic ideas of privacy and its
accompanying management and imagine it in a world that will
exist tomorrow. Soon we will live in a world where vehicles or,
frankly, any type of machine, will talk to each other about us—
whether directly or indirectly—and will negotiate with each other
on our behalf to make decisions in our best interest for a wide
range of purposes, some of which we have not yet imagined.
Depending on the scenario, these negotiations are certain to
include varying levels of our personal information. While these
vehicle-to-vehicle (V2V), vehicle-to-infrastructure (V2I), and
machine-to-machine (M2M) negotiations will simplify and
improve our lives, we must prepare for a future that allows for
these eventualities as they challenge our current approaches to
managing privacy.
Privacy, at its core, is about choice and control. This includes
control of information about the self, particularly one’s identity,
but also includes connecting that identity with associated
1. Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV.
L. REV. 193, 195 (1890) (internal quotation marks omitted).
2. Id. at 195.
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metadata such as actions, activities, thoughts, desires,
affiliations, habits, preferences, and beliefs. The right to privacy,
the extent to which that right can be asserted, and the principle
of individual control have been well established for decades. But
privacy is a constant negotiation between the individual and
society about the boundaries of the two worlds of public and
private. While the concept of what is specifically private is often
in a state of flux, we are currently seeing a seismic shift in
consumer habits.3 The normative values are changing rapidly as
technology presses forward, forcing a serious renegotiation of the
boundaries of privacy far too regularly.
The digital age, with its rapid pace of developing enabling
technologies particularly around the collection of personal data
and related metadata, long-term storage, and immediate
retrieval, has vastly outpaced the ability of both society and
policymakers to adequately adapt privacy controls.4 The idea of
individual control over privacy flows into the current “formulaic
system of notice and consent,”5 which may no longer be a suitable
mechanism to ensure adequate privacy. The concept has been
challenged both in 1:1 (user: service) communication and in big
data scenarios and has prevailed so far. It will need to further
adapt, however, for scenarios such as when a rapid series of time
sensitive 1:1 consents are required or with 1:N (one-to-many)
real-time communications between machines. Because of this
pace, we are in a constant reactive state rather than
meaningfully preparing for the inevitable “next things” regarding
commerce, data, and the needs and expectations around privacy
when it comes to a merger of the physical and digital world.

3. Consumers’ Privacy Concerns Grow, WARC (Jan. 25, 2017),
https://www.warc.com/NewsAndOpinion/News/38101 (last visited Apr. 24, 2017)
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
4. See VIKTOR MAYER-SCHOENBERGER & KENNETH CUKIER, BIG DATA: A
REVOLUTION THAT WILL TRANSFORM HOW WE LIVE, WORK, AND THINK 17 (2013)
(“[T]he big-data era also challenges us to become better prepared for the ways in
which harnessing the technology will change our institutions and ourselves.”).
5. Id. at 173.
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II. Solutions for Privacy Challenges in the Digital Age

To approach a solution, it is often worthwhile to take a step
back to understand how the challenge has emerged. The origins
of digital privacy management come from a long-passed,
contractual approach to sharing personal information in which a
method of notice and informed consent is applied and the affected
individual can easily grasp the scope of the ecosystem within
which their data will persist.6 Originally in paper form, the
individual would disclose some private information and the form
would include simple language about the purpose and intent of
the data collection, the sacredness of privacy, and the recognition
of the duties of the collecting entity to maintain the data
responsibly.7 In our current privacy paradigm, often focused
around digital communication devices and services, the
underlying ecosystem is almost wholly obfuscated and is now so
complex that few individuals besides industry experts can truly
understand the actual breadth to which the provided data is
used, shared, and stored.
Along with the vagaries of purposes when consenting to
private data collection on digital devices, an additional privacy
challenge occurs today because there is a burden placed on the
individual to consent while under the pressure of attempting to
utilize a service, such as the first time a mobile application is
launched, or directly prior to installing it.8 Furthermore, it is
generally unclear what functionality is impacted if the consent is
declined and there is often no opportunity to decline consent for
specific types of personal data while consenting to other data or
6. See Jeroen van den Hoven et al., Privacy and Information Technology,
STAN.
ENCYCLOPEDIA
OF
PHIL.
(Nov.
20,
2014),
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/it-privacy/ (last visited Apr. 24, 2017)
(describing how informed consent is the principle underlying all data protection
laws) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
7. See DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., NOTICE OF PRIVACY PRACTICES
FOR
PROTECTED
HEALTH
INFORMATION
1–2
(2003),
https://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/ocr/privacy/hipaa/understanding/coverede
ntities/notice.pdf (providing the required contents of the notice).
8. See Masooda Bashir et al., Online Privacy and Informed Consent: The
Dilemma
of
Information
Asymmetry,
at
2
(2015),
https://www.asist.org/files/meetings/am15/proceedings/submissions/papers/97pa
per.pdf (“Either the user agrees to give up all their personal information to the
service or they choose not to use the service at all.”).
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consenting to data at a specific chosen level of granularity (such
as revealing one’s zip code versus a home address).9 Terms of
Service and Privacy Policies are often incredibly long, full of
legalese, complex, and overly confusing (some would argue by
design). There is no simple way for any user to understand how
her data is being used by a single company much less understand
the state of her privacy at any given point considering all of the
permissions that may have been granted to separate entities over
time. The possibility of the individual to adequately assert her
“right to be forgotten” is well-nigh impossible as she has no clue
what entities have what personal data about her and therefore no
way to verify or validate the state of her privacy in any
meaningful way.10 Transparency into privacy may exist at a
micro level such as per company, but at the macro level of the
individual’s shared privacy footprint across the digital landscape,
there is no such thing. To add insult to injury, the current
response to the individual who wishes to reclaim her privacy (or
even some semblance of control) from the multitude of entities
she interacts with for basic modern engagement is often “what
did you expect, you’ve given your permission while failing to read
the terms of service?”11 The victim is therefore blamed.
This is the current landscape, and the future of digital
privacy appears hopeless without some radical rethinking. The
evolution from personal (i.e. in-person) privacy data interactions
9. See id. at 9 (“Our survey results illustrate this perception of coercion,
as the vast majority of respondents (81%) indicated that in at least one incident,
they had submitted information online when they wished they were not
required to do so.”); EURO. DATA PROTECTION SUPERVISOR, GUIDELINES ON THE
PROTECTION OF PERSONAL DATA PROCESSED BY MOBILE APPLICATIONS (2016),
https://edps.europa.eu/sites/edp/files/publication/16-11-07_guidelines_mobile_ap
ps_en.pdf (providing that consent should be specific, expressed through an
active choice, and freely given).
10. See generally JOSEPH TUROW, MICHAEL HENNESSY & NORA DRAPER, THE
TRADEOFF FALLACY, ANNENBERG SCH. FOR COMM., U. PENN (Aug. 10, 2016),
https://www.asc.upenn.edu/sites/default/files/TradeoffFallacy_1.pdf
(arguing
against the notion that Americans willingly give up privacy for benefits).
11. Robert Glancy, Will You Read This Article About Terms and
Conditions? You Really Should Do, GUARDIAN (Apr. 24, 2014),
https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/apr/24/terms-and-conditionsonline-small-print-information (last visited Apr. 24, 2017) (“We live in a time of
terms and conditions. Never before have we signed or agreed [to] so many. But
one thing hasn’t changed: we still rarely read them.”) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
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occurring between an individual and a known physical entity, to
the digital equivalent of that physical entity, and now further on
to a multitude of tangentially-known digital entities regularly
requesting access to a myriad of personal data points, has led to a
system of consent and consumer protection that no longer makes
sense. Additionally, applying this current system to near-future
concepts of maintaining control and managing digital privacy in
cases where time sensitive M2M communications containing
“privacy payloads” (sets of personal or private data) occurs is
fundamentally broken, meaning that the modern methods of
notice and consent will soon become unsustainable. We need a
new approach to concepts of granting consent, managing privacy,
and dealing with the need to interact quickly and meaningfully
while reducing the information asymmetry between the user and
collecting entities that is commonplace in modern privacy
negotiations.
This Article rethinks the traditional notice and consent
model in the context of real-time M2M communication and
proposes a re-engineering of privacy concepts to prepare for a
rapidly approaching digital future. In this future, multiple
independent actors—in the form of vehicles or other machines—
may seek personal or private information at a rate that makes
the traditional informed consent model untenable. While this
article focuses on V2V or V2I communication, the principles
outlined can also apply to various M2M cases in which a privacy
payload is involved (e.g. drones identifying who they belong to
when negotiating priority in airspace, or after being involved in
an accident).
A two-step approach is proposed. The first step is an attempt
to meet and balance user needs for a seamless experience while
preserving their rights to privacy. It is believed that by shifting
our approach to consent away from the traditional 1:1 model, and
towards a more general management method similar to how we
handle the current configuration options for cookie acceptance in
a web browser, we will maintain privacy while allowing for a
number of high-value use cases to develop. Examples of such
cases include improving infrastructure in smart city initiatives,
monitoring the performance of a vehicle, or increasing traffic
safety.
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The second step proposes the concept of Privacy-as-a-Service
in which a configured service negotiates privacy on behalf of the
individual and collects an audit trail of entities requesting and
granted data from the vehicle, or machine, on behalf of the user.
In this sense, there is a huge opportunity for the individual to
reclaim control of her privacy by consenting to the level of
granularity that she prefers while radically increasing general
transparency around what is collected and by what entity, thus
reducing current information asymmetry. This approach allows
for commercial and technological progress to take on many forms,
at whatever pace is fitting, without the need for defining
completely new methods of privacy control. Lastly, such a system
can be accomplished without regulation, thereby removing
reactive restrictions that limit commercial opportunities due to
consumer’s appropriate feelings of exploitation, victimization, and
helplessness.
III. Consent Reimagined
A. Preparing for a Future of On-the-Fly Privacy Management
Tomorrow’s smart city initiatives will collect data about
vehicles interacting within municipal systems to provide
information regarding such actions as road usage and parking
dwell time behaviors, thereby improving traffic efficiency by
utilizing an invisible data layer, created by vehicles, on top of the
existing infrastructure.12 Systems are being developed to
broadcast information between vehicles such as slowing traffic
ahead, an accident, or a dangerous patch of road. This
information enables drivers or vehicles to make navigation
decisions that increase safety and maximize traffic flow.13
Collaboration between connected vehicles or vehicles and
infrastructure will improve traffic safety beyond all current
recognition14 and is critical to master the next levels of
12. A European Strategy on Cooperative Intelligent Transport Systems, A
Milestone Towards Cooperative, Connected and Automated Mobility, EUR. PARL.
DOC. (COM 766) 2, 3 (2016) [hereinafter A European Strategy]
13. Id.; Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards, 49 C.F.R. § 571 (2016).
14. 49 C.F.R. §§ 571.101–500 (providing instructive research for the
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automation and highly autonomous driving. Connectivity can
enable multimodal transport systems connecting all different
actors, from vehicles to pedestrians, cyclists, drones,
infrastructure, traffic managers and mobility providers,
structuring their behavior and matching supply and demand in
real time. While there are plenty of examples of data sharing
opportunities related to the functioning of road networks,
municipal information, traffic safety, or the functioning of a truly
integrated transportation system, there are also untold
commercial applications of personal data imported or derived
from a vehicle, a user, or the interactions of a user in a vehicle.15
Vehicles will collect more data via built-in sensors and also
become more connected to cloud services, the internet, the
infrastructure, digital platforms, and each other.
These next steps of innovation in mobility leading to a
market disruption entailing fundamental and game-changing
autonomous systems will be enabled through digitized
communication. Cooperation and communication between
intelligent and connected vehicles is a prerequisite to enable
higher levels of automation and to significantly improve traffic
safety.16 Thus, solving privacy issues with V2V and V2I
communication is necessary to prepare for the future of mobility.
While some of the manifold information generated through
vehicle sensors and transmitted from the vehicle can be provided
in anonymized form without carrying a privacy payload, other
information may be reasonably linkable to an individual or may
sometimes be considered personal data due to different
regulatory approaches in different jurisdictions.17
United States Department of Transportation, National Highway Traffic Safety
Administration).
15. See MCKINSEY & CO., AUTOMOTIVE REVOLUTION—PERSPECTIVE
TOWARDS
2030,
at
6
(2016),
http://www.mckinsey.com/~/media/mckinsey/industries/high%20tech/our%20insi
ghts/disruptive%20trends%20that%20will%20transform%20the%20auto%20ind
ustry/auto%202030%20report%20jan%202016.ashx (“Connectivity, and later
autonomous technology, will increasingly allow the car to become a platform for
drivers and passengers to use their transit time for personal activities, which
could include the use of novel forms of media and services.”).
16. A European Strategy, supra note 12, at 2; 49 C.F.R. § 571.
17. See A European Strategy, supra note 12, at 8. For a highly different
approach, however excluding collection or use of V2V data by commercial
entities or other third parties, see 49 C.F.R. § 571.
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In an environment in which vehicles are broadcasting and
sharing personal data, the appropriate consents of the affected
individuals must be obtained. A consent is the manifestation of
the individual´s “say” regarding control over her right to
privacy.18 In the case of multiple parties near-simultaneously
requesting time sensitive consent, the current 1:1 consent based
models employed in the physical world or by software
applications between actors with clear role allocations do not
scale. Mobility’s future dynamic information ecosystem with
multiple stakeholders includes data collectors with whom the
individual has not had a relationship before and leads to difficult
questions as to who is the data controller and who is the data
subject to be protected by the privacy laws in a given data
interaction.19 Even in the case of a single entity requesting
consent, its Terms of Service and Privacy Policy could rarely be
meaningfully reviewed by the motivated person on the move. This
problem is compounded by the behavior of potentially dozens of
vehicles or entities asking for variable permissions of a given
driver at a point in time. Aside from the driver behaving in one of
three subpar manners (grant all, grant none, grant randomly) the
cognitive burden on them is unduly intense considering the
distractive and annoying aspects that something akin to pop-up
consent requests would create.20
Given the above scenarios, the future of V2V or V2I
communication includes the potential for a multitude of separate
actors vying for general and specific personal data controlled by
drivers, in real time or near-real time. These actors could include
other vehicles, municipal signal towers, infrastructure objects
like traffic signs and stoplights, buildings and billboards, and a
variety of actors that have yet to manifest. Each actor will have
18. See generally ICO, CONSULTATION: GDPR CONSENT GUIDANCE (2017),
https://ico.org.uk/media/about-the-ico/consultations/2013551/draft-gdpr-consentguidance-for-consultation-201703.pdf (providing guidance on how to conform
with the GDPR in the UK).
19. See FUTURE OF PRIVACY FORUM, COMMENT LETTER ON THE DEP’T OF
TRANSPORTATION AND NAT’L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN.’S FEDERAL
AUTOMATED VEHICLES POLICY GUIDANCE 9 (Nov. 22, 2016) [hereinafter FUTURE
OF
PRIVACY
FORUM
NHTSA
COMMENTS],
https://fpf.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/FPF-Comments-on-DOT-Guidance_1
12216_Final.pdf.
20. Id. at 7.

734

73 WASH. & LEE L. REV. ONLINE 724 (2017)

its own potentially complex purpose, request specific types of
information, and will often need consent for collecting such
information nearly instantaneously.
Transferring the legal requirements for a valid consent under
the European Union’s upcoming General Data Protection
Regulation (GDPR)21 or in the U.S. requiring a comparable type
of notice and choice to the above use-cases leads to a basic
conclusion: The current consent schemes are too static and
cumbersome for scenarios with multiple unknown actors in
shared spaces and split-second communication and decision
making, and the schemes do not support the kinds of high
frequency and highly agile communication required for safe and
seamless future transportation experiences. Consequently, we
need to rethink the current approach, modify the requirements
for a valid consent, and prepare for a future of on-the-fly privacy
management.
B. Consent Under the GDPR
The European strategy on Cooperative Intelligent Transport
Systems (C-ITS) concludes that “data broadcast by C-ITS from
vehicles will, in principle, qualify as personal data as it will relate
to an identified or identifiable natural person.”22 Under the
upcoming GDPR in the European Union, “consent” of the
respective individual, the data subject, means “any freely given,
specific, informed, and unambiguous indication of the data
subject’s wishes by which he or she, by a statement or by a clear
affirmative action, signifies agreement to the processing of
personal data relating to him or her.”23 Based on these
requirements, consent must relate to specific processing
operations.24 Consequently, a general broad consent to
unspecified processing operations as they might arise would be
21. See generally Council Regulation 2016/679, 2016 O.J. (L 119). The
GDPR enters into force on May 25, 2018.
22. A European Strategy, supra note 12, at 8. We use the term “personal
data” in the sense of Article 4 (1) of the GDPR. See Council Regulation 2016/679,
supra note 21, at L 119/33.
23. Council Regulation 2016/679, supra note 21, at L 119/34.
24. Id.
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invalid. For consent to be informed, “the data subject should be
aware at least of the identity of the controller and the purposes of
the processing for which the personal data are intended.”25 A
clear affirmative action
could include ticking a box when visiting an internet website,
choosing technical settings for information society services or
another statement or conduct which clearly indicates in this
context the data subject´s acceptance of the proposed
processing of his or her personal data. Silence, pre-ticked
boxes or inactivity should not therefore constitute consent.
Consent should cover all processing activities carried out for
the same purpose or purposes. When the processing has
multiple purposes, consent should be given for all of them. If
the data subject´s consent is to be given following a request by
electronic means, the request must be clear, concise and not
unnecessarily disruptive to the use of the service for which it
is provided.26

This means people shall positively and demonstrably indicate
that they agree with the proposed data collection and use before
it happens. It also means that the individual needs to know the
requesting entity, the type of data to be collected, and the
envisaged purposes of data processing. In addition, the individual
must have the “genuine choice” to agree or disagree to the
collection and further processing of her personal data and that
these requirements function as a minimum standard to provide
her with a solid information basis for her choice.27
Applying these strict requirements for a valid consent to the
previously mentioned use-cases presents several difficult
challenges. First, in such a dynamic, multi-actor environment, it
would be extremely difficult, if at all possible, to obtain consent
that is specific enough to satisfy current and proposed regulatory
requirements. When a vehicle is broadcasting information via a
wireless network, other nearby vehicles and infrastructure units
can receive the messages and respond to them. Each vehicle may
be both broadcasting and receiving multiple communications
simultaneously. To have a meaningful impact on traffic safety
necessitates communication between vehicles with very low
25.
26.
27.

Id. at L 119/8.
Id. at L 119/6.
Id. at L 119/8.

736

73 WASH. & LEE L. REV. ONLINE 724 (2017)

latency,28 and services for the management of traffic flows or
efficiency improvements that utilize swarm intelligence will
require near real time communications to generate valuable
information. In both contexts, it is difficult to determine the data
controller as the party defining the purposes and means of the
processing of personal data,29 especially since the controllers are
likely not to have an established relationship with the
broadcasting data subject. If it is unclear with whom
context-specific information is going to be shared, transparency
can only be provided ad hoc or in a more generic way. Current
solutions, such as just-in-time notices,30 that have been
established as best practices in smartphone applications could
distract the driver of a vehicle and are therefore detrimental from
a safety perspective and would likely overload the driver with
multiple simultaneous requests to provide consent.31
Another challenge is the limitation of “real” choices, required
in principle for a “freely given” consent. It is impossible to provide
individuals with actual choice in scenarios where the reliability of
safety functions, or even the operations of highly autonomous
vehicles, require a continuous data communication. Any
requirement to interrupt or disrupt connectivity to obtain
considered choice would impair functionalities, leading to reduced
safety and opening the door for even more complex liability
questions in case something goes wrong.32
It is therefore apparent that a strict interpretation of the
GDPR’s transparency requirements would render it impossible to
obtain a valid consent for collecting and processing personal data
in
connected
vehicle
scenarios
with
high-frequency
communication between multiple actors. At this stage, the data
28. V2V messages are broadcast in a limited range ten times per second.
See Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards, 49 C.F.R. § 571 (2016).
29. Council Regulation 2016/679, supra note 21, at L 119/33.
30. NAT’L SCI. AND TECH. COUNCIL, NATIONAL PRIVACY RESEARCH STRATEGY
15–16
(2016),
https://www.nitrd.gov/PUBS/NationalPrivacyResearchStrat
egy.pdf.
31. See FUTURE OF PRIVACY FORUM NHTSA COMMENTS, supra note 19, at 7
(discussing how just-in-time notices that appear on a phone’s screen when
opening apps could distract drivers).
32. See id. at 8 (“These are challenging considerations given the rapidly
changing pace of these technologies, and definitional lines may prove difficult to
draw at this time.”).
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protection law presents a bottleneck for the next level of
advanced vehicle connectivity and thus threatens to be a burden
to realizing the overwhelmingly positive impact of such
technologies on society.
C. A Loophole: The Future of Mobility Is Communication
One of the key questions the U.S. National Privacy Research
Strategy asks is “how can notice and choice be standardized and
conveyed in ways that facilitate automation and reduce
transaction costs for users and stakeholders?”33 A feasible
approach to answer this question for the connected vehicle
context can be deduced from upcoming regulation in the
European Union.
In early January 2017, the European Commission published
the draft Regulation on Privacy and Electronic Communications
(Regulation),34 the replacement of the ePrivacy Directive (also
known as the “Cookie Directive”).35 Although only a draft for the
time being, once in effect, the Regulation will enter the next level
of the “Internet of Everything” and go far beyond cookie rules, as
set forth in its Recital 12:
Connected devices and machines increasingly communicate
with each other by using electronic communications networks
(Internet of Things). The transmission of machine-to-machine
communications involves the conveyance of signals over a
network and, hence, usually constitutes an electronic
communications service. In order to ensure full protection of
the rights to privacy and confidentiality of communications,
and to promote a trusted and secure Internet of Things in the
digital single market, it is necessary to clarify that this
Regulation
should
apply
to
the
transmission
of
machine-to-machine communications.36

33. NATIONAL PRIVACY RESEARCH STRATEGY, supra note 30, at 16.
34. Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the
Council Concerning the Respect for Private Life and the Protection of Personal
Data in Electronic Communications and Repealing Directive 2002/58/EC, EUR.
PARL. DOC. (COM 10) (2017) [hereinafter The Regulation].
35. Council Directive 2002/58, 2002 O.J. (L 201) (EC).
36. The Regulation, supra note 34, at 13–14.
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With this important clarification, the proposed regulatory
content would apply to V2V and V2I communication.
With respect to cookies, the Regulation considers the need for
an undisturbed user experience:
The methods used for providing information and obtaining
end-user´s consent should be as user-friendly as possible.
Given the ubiquitous use of tracking cookies and other
tracking techniques, end-users are increasingly requested to
provide consent to store such tracking cookies in their
terminal equipment.37 As a result, end-users are overloaded
with requests to provide consent. The use of technical means
to provide consent, for example, through transparent and
user-friendly settings, may address this problem. Therefore,
this Regulation should provide for the possibility to express
consent by using the appropriate settings of a browser or other
application.38

The European Commission considers web browsers as
gatekeepers and sees them “in a privileged position to play an
active role to help the end-user to control the flow of information
to and from the terminal equipment.”39 Therefore, the draft
Regulation would ideally like consent to be obtained at the device
configuration stage. Instead of having to give consent every time
a website wants to track a user, users should be able to configure
their browsers to either accept tracking or not, or to grant this
right only to selected parties, be it truly trusted partners or
providers simply offering an indispensable service. The
implication is that a device would need to present a clear option
to the user, who would then be forced to make a positive decision
to allow the data collection. This approach, adopted from today’s
web browser or smart device configuration methods, presents a
37. “Terminal equipment” pursuant to Article 1 of Commission Directive
2008/63, 2008 O.J. (L 162) 21 (EC), means:
Equipment directly or indirectly connected to the interface of a public
telecommunications network to send, process or receive information;
in either case . . . the connection may be made by wire, optical fibre or
electromagnetically; a connection is indirect if equipment is placed
between the terminal and the interface of the network.
Although the draft Regulation only mentions smart phones, tablets, and
computers as examples for terminal equipment, connected vehicles clearly fall
into this category as well.
38. The Regulation, supra note 34, at 17 (emphasis added).
39. Id.
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solution for the challenge described above of adopting specific
consent
requirements
to
fast-paced
multi-stakeholder
communication in the connected vehicle. Additionally, the device
configuration model is also a suitable means to provide the
appropriate level of transparency and choice to enable next levels
of vehicle connectivity as the requesting entities will be nothing
more than providers of “information society services,”40 similar to
those in use today.
The draft Regulation emphasizes that consent of an end-user
shall have the same meaning and be subject to the same
conditions as the data subject´s consent under the GDPR.41 This
might be surprising, as transparency regarding the identity of the
data controller, specific purposes, or requested data elements can
only be provided on a more generic level through configurations
such as “accept all 3rd party cookies.” This is not a contradiction,
however, given that the GDPR explicitly provides that “choosing
technical settings for information society services” is an
appropriate means to obtain consent.42 Because future mobility
will, to a large extent, be enabled through communication
services, vehicle connectivity can be treated the same way as
classical information society services that enable communication
between humans. Additionally, device configurations regarding
connectivity functions embedded in the vehicle present the most
reliable solution to reach the driver as the privacy protected
individual, respectively the driver as the individual with the
highest privacy related risk profile in a vehicle with a steering
wheel. For example, individual drivers could pre-select their
privacy settings or profiles such as “accept all 3rd party requests”
through an online or app-based dashboard. Each individual’s
privacy profile would be recognized by the vehicle, either through
active driver input or connectivity-based recognition of the
settings in a driver’s smartphone or other personal digital device.
The vehicle would then automatically adjust its communications
and sensor technologies to accommodate the privacy choices of
40. Pursuant to Article 1(1)(b) of Directive 2015/1535, 2015 O.J. (L 241) 3
(EC), an information society service is “any service normally provided for
remuneration, at a distance, by electronic means and at the individual request
of a recipient of services.”
41. The Regulation, supra note 34, at 15.
42. Council Regulation 2016/679, supra note 21, at L 119/6.

740

73 WASH. & LEE L. REV. ONLINE 724 (2017)

individual drivers. Such a system would allow a single vehicle to
accommodate the privacy preferences of multiple individual
drivers in situations where vehicles may include pooled use, such
as with families or through vehicle sharing services. Compare the
privacy related driver settings to seating or mirror adjustments
covering the specific needs of the respective driver. Ultimately,
the device configuration model comes along with less transaction
specific transparency. However, it provides a viable solution for
declaring consent in high-frequency communications and it
respects individual choice by targeting the decision making
directly to the individual driver. Additionally, this model is
derived from established and socially accepted norms for classical
web browsing, which is nothing else than mobility in the digital
space.
The EU’s C-ITS initiative names as one action item for its
next steps “ensuring the practical implementation of the GDPR in
the area of C-ITS.”43 At the same time, the National Highway
Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) seeks comment on ways
to provide consumers with more of a choice to “opt in” to V2V
technology.44 The draft Regulation on Privacy and Electronic
Communications presents a transferable solution as a way out,
preventing data privacy laws from being bottlenecks for the
connectivity-enabled disruption of the mobility market.
The proposed near-term solution suggests a practical and
expedient way to solve an upcoming issue where privacy and
technology may collide, with a net benefit of seamless interaction
for the user and the requesting services. The solution, however,
fails to improve the privacy and control of the individual, merely
extending a current interaction method that is functional but
prone to legal challenge. As technologies advance, we should
strive to improve the quality of all aspects of interaction models,
not just provide additional functionality. As such, the systems of
tomorrow should include both technological improvements as well
as better and more complete solutions to human comfort and
ethical issues such as privacy and trust.

43.
44.

A European Strategy, supra note 12, at 11.
See Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards, 49 C.F.R. § 571 (2016).
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IV. Abstracting Privacy Control: The Virtues of
Privacy-as-a-Service
As mentioned previously, in the future of V2V and V2I
communications it is expected that a travelling vehicle will
encounter requests and receive information from many separate
agents such as other vehicles and infrastructure components,
potentially in very short periods of time if not in a constant
stream. The potential for a barrage of data sharing requests to a
driver who, despite the autonomous nature of the vehicle, is
expected to be prepared to take control at any point, creates a
situation in which deciphering the nuances of any given terms of
service or even recognizing the requesting entities may be an
impossible challenge. It is therefore obvious that the 1:1 approach
we employ today—in which each requesting entity presents a
privacy policy to the engaging party, and then waits for the party
to positively respond by accepting or rejecting the terms—no
longer makes sense in this fast-paced future with a hyper mobile
society.
Because current methods do not meet the needs required in a
fair exchange, we must strive to create new systems that meet
the needs of all interested parties. The basic options to solve this
issue appear to be threefold: (1) limit information ecosystems to
those that do not collect personal data and therefore do not
require terms of service agreements and thereby forego the data,
revenue, and quality of life improvements such ecosystems
provide; (2) manage privacy offline such that permissions are
granted to specific entities prior to their being requested; or (3)
dynamically manage privacy in the moment, as we do today. Each
of these options has its challenges, and in order to unlock the
power of available data while maintaining privacy, we believe
that a hybrid approach is required that transcends the
individual’s management of privacy choices at the moment of
access.
A. The Need for Privacy Control—From Illusion to Reality
In addition to the fundamental belief that the user is entitled
to an appropriately unencumbered experience when interacting
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with the broad array of services that make up the digital life of
today and tomorrow, there exists the need for a sense of user
control over the types of data that are being shared with all
entities involved in the digital services ecosystem.45 Additionally,
the ability to meaningfully maintain access after the fact through
review, editing, and wholesale revocation must be respected. As
the number of services users interact with on a regular basis
become more and more digitized, the opportunity for these
services to request and collect personal data increases.
Additionally, as the number of digital entities a user interacts
with on a regular basis goes from a small number to hundreds or
thousands, the ability to understand and maintain an accurate
inventory of what data is shared with which entity may become
impossible, leaving the user with a feeling that they are no longer
in control of their privacy. Even today, in a world of third party
cookies we see concerns about privacy regarding what details
entities or groups of entities know about a given person.46 As
technology has progressed without adequately keeping privacy in
mind, consumers find themselves in an environment ripe for
abuse or exploitation by unscrupulous actors. In today’s new
world even trusted entities may have knowledge of the individual
that is described by the consumer as “creepy.” The sense of
helplessness and confusion the public experiences when realizing
that someone knows too much is coupled with their belief that
they are unable to meaningfully do something about it.47 This
then manifests in feelings of distrust and discomfort regarding
data oriented systems in general, thereby creating a collective cry
for help that gets the courts and regulators involved. There is a
45. See generally Glen Nowak & Joseph Phelps, Direct Marketing and the
Use of Individual-Level Consumer Information: Determining How and When
“Privacy” Matters, 9 J. DIRECT MARKETING 46 (2005) (discussing the importance
of control with respect to individuals’ views of privacy).
46. Mary Madden & Lee Rainie, Americans’ Attitudes About Privacy,
Security
and
Surveillance,
PEW.
RES.
CTR.
(May
20,
2015),
http://www.pewinternet.org/2015/05/20/americans-attitudes-about-privacy-secur
ity-and-surveillance/ (last visited Apr. 24, 2017) (on file with the Washington
and Lee Law Review).
47. IRINA SHKLOVSKI ET AL., LEAKINESS AND CREEPINESS IN APP SPACE:
PERCEPTIONS
OF
PRIVACY
AND
MOBILE
APP
USE
(2014),
https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/a9b0/e4481dfe588cf104baf7a8b7876dd94574d7.
pdf.
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compound complexity regarding personal data today: the general
public is uninformed about what data is collected, the collecting
entities are minimally transparent regarding why collection
occurs, revocation is nontrivial, and solutions from courts and
regulators are often overreaching, difficult to enforce, and
circumventable. The consumer requires control of her data, a
sense that she is ultimately granting access when appropriate
and that she is able to rescind it at will, immediately and
unapologetically in as simple a fashion as is possible.
B. The Need for Transparency
The concept of having a “trusted relationship” with a digital
entity is abstract at best. The exchange engaged in is often a
trade of individual and potentially private information for access
to a helpful service. That information is then used, often in
opaque ways, to later monetize the use of the service through
advertising, lead generation, or other means.48 The
understanding of what is being exchanged and why is often
vague, while the instant gratification of meeting a specific need
suffices to distract the majority of consumers from too deeply
considering the actions they have just taken. Privacy advocates
and those devoting additional time to contemplating the quid pro
quo in these digital exchanges have an uphill battle when the
public appears not to care until some trigger experience occurs
and suddenly they feel betrayed or victimized. Research has
shown that the public is often unaware or misinformed regarding
the specifics of what agreements have been made, what data is
under the control of the offending entity, and what entity is
actually involved.49 In this way, it is reasonable to assume the
user has little understanding of how to regain control of that data
and therefore, the terms of the relationship (e.g. to edit, erase, or
48. See Laurence Ashworth & Clinton Free, Marketing Dataveillance and
Digital Privacy: Using Theories of Justice to Understand Consumers’ Online
Privacy Concerns, 67 J. BUS. ETHICS 107, 111 (2006) (describing the “exchange
model of online marketing”).
49. See TUROW ET AL., supra note 10, at 4 (finding “that large percentages of
Americans often don’t have the basic knowledge to make informed cost-benefit
choices about ways marketers use their information”).
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completely rescind access permanently). An appeal to an
authority is a likely response, with the courts and enforcement
agencies weighing in on the apparent exploitative behavior in the
worst cases and then further crafting policy and law to protect
the offended public and punish egregious offenders.
Increased and true transparency for the user is one answer
to these problems, both as a means to enable review of what has
happened when a surprising situation occurs as well as to provide
a method to reduce the likelihood of such a surprise occurring in
the first place. Complete, consistent, and standardized
transparency is sorely needed; not just within a given data
collecting company or sector, but across entities and sectors. A
common language, a standard format, and an accessible record
can all go a long way in helping consumers feel comfortable and
more importantly “in control” of their data, and the privacy
oriented relationship they have with any given entity.

V. Privacy-as-a-Service: A Solution to Enhance Privacy While
Promoting Data Sharing
A. The Complexity of Privacy
The number of services, the rate of changes these services
experience, and the complexity and nuance of personal data
access requested are only going to increase in the future. As such,
it is not a stretch to assume that managing privacy will
increasingly require a level of attention and knowledge that is a
burden to the common individual. The resulting behavior due to
ignorance and “privacy fatigue” is that the user is likely to give
up and grant access to data they would otherwise never grant,
and to entities that are not held to appropriate standards based
on what they are requesting.50 We are at a point in which our
approach to permissions is exploitative and broken, but it
remains successful only because the consumer cannot
50. See id. at 9 (“People we meet have decided they seriously cannot . . . do
anything else that will allow them to manage their personal information the
way they want. . . . They have slid into resignation—a sense that that while
they want control over their data world they will never achieve it.”).
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meaningfully interpret what she is agreeing to. This is a fragile
ecosystem, subject to massive disruption if the public protests too
much due to the feeling that their control is overly threatened. In
the interest of righting this imbalance, whereby services and
products take advantage of the current ecosystem of ignorance, a
Privacy-as-a-Service model makes sense.
B. A Configured Solution Can Address Privacy Complexities for
Future Digital Services
Imagine a future scenario in which a driver enters her
autonomous car, runs a number of local errands downtown,
crosses a toll bridge to have lunch with a friend, and then returns
home. During her time in the car she listened to music, browsed
for clothing, and made a phone call. Throughout this scenario a
huge number of vehicles and machines would have communicated
with her vehicle for a wide variety of reasons. Infrastructure
beacons collected information about her car to monitor traffic
data and to understand that she is a local commuter, a routing
service from her car connected to her digital task list in her cloud
based computing system to plan a route for guiding the car on the
most efficient path to run all her errands, the parking garages
and tolling systems identified the vehicle and charged her
accounts appropriately, and other vehicles traded data with her
vehicle about road hazards, and recent hyperlocal map updates
like street conditions. All of these things happened seamlessly,
without interrupting her browsing, music listening, or phone call,
though several of the services required negotiating permissions
for access to different levels of personal data and many of the
services were connecting to her car for the first time. Imagine
further that this situation plays out in a way that she maintains
complete control over what personal data is shared, at a granular
level, with each requesting entity, and that she can review,
update, and revoke all prior and future data collection (or edit her
preferences) at any time. This transparent, configurable, privacy
protecting methodology could be available if we abstract today’s
data
permission
interaction
models
into
a
robust
Privacy-as-a-Service approach.
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C. A Solution That Respects the Needs of Consumers with Varying
Opinions Regarding Privacy
Personality differences will account for varied levels of
interest and comfort in negotiating privacy and the granularity of
information an individual is willing to share.51 Additionally, the
amount of time an individual wants to spend on such
configurations will differ. A Privacy-as-a-Service system can
provide coarse tolerance levels that create generic “risk level”
defaults that a user can then manipulate as they see fit, if they so
desire. After setting the preferences, the configured device (such
as an automobile) will then negotiate privacy according to the
service based on the user configuration. Machine management of
personal data will be necessary, and this is one solution to
maintaining privacy and giving the user actual control over what
types of data are shared, how, and with whom. The balance of
power is therefore restored to the user.
Similar to how consumers will vary in how much interest
they have in general privacy, the amount of trust in each data
requesting entity will also vary.52 There can be no automatic
consent, nor should there be the expectation of a wholesale
sharing of a full privacy payload, even to a fully trusted actor. A
person may be fine sharing their car model with a data-collecting
stoplight (so that it can estimate weight and thereby provide data
to a smart city for estimating road wear) but may not want to also
provide a Vehicle Identification Number. For many of the current
well-known data requestors in the mobile application and social
media space, true granularity of data permissions is
nonexistent.53 In the future, granularity as an aspect of privacy
51. See generally Stefan Stieger, Christoph Burger, Manueal Bohn &
Martin Voracek, Who Commits Virtual Identity Suicide? Differences in Privacy
Concerns, Internet Addiction, and Personality Between Facebook Users and
Quitters, 16 CYBERPSYCHOLOGY, BEHAVIOR & SOCIAL NETWORKING 629 (2013)
(discussing the effect of personality on individuals’ privacy concerns).
52. Matthew Quint & David Rogers, What is the Future of Data Sharing?,
SLIDESHARE
(Oct.
30
2015),
http://www.slideshare.net/DavidRogersBiz/what-is-the-future-of-data-sharing-co
nsumer-mindsets-and-the-power-of-brands (last visited Apr. 24, 2017) (on file
with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
53. See Supriya Shinde & S. S. Sambare, Survey on Privacy Permission
Management Approaches for Android OS Applications, 107 INT’L J. COMPUT.
APPLICATIONS 14, 14 (2014) (arguing that “a new mode of privacy is needed in
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control may be a key consumer expectation, potentially adding
significant additional time-consuming complication to the
common request-for-consent model, further revealing its
inadequacies in the current state.
A primary contributor in today’s asymmetry of information
between consumer and data requester may be the false sense of
choice (or the “illusion of control”) a user is often given when
making personal data sharing decisions with digital systems.54 In
many cases the user can only grant or deny wholesale access to
classes of personal data (such as members of a contact list) with
minimal insight into why this access is necessary and with the
penalty that, by not sharing this information, the product or
service is wholly unavailable for use.55 The user is not provided
with the ability to negotiate privacy at a more granular level but,
rather, can only choose the more convenient, expedient, and
potentially overreaching binary choice provided. The onus is on
the user to either comply or completely forego use of the service.
By contrast, in a managed solution to privacy there can be a
re-empowerment of the individual user by taking advantage of
the shared nature of the general management settings through a
Privacy-as-a-Service provider. Overreach will be “punished” by
denying the offending service the access to data the community
has determined is overly sensitive or unnecessary for the
requesting service and that is thereby suppressed through the
Privacy-as-a-Service system by default. For those who want more
fine-tuned control over their personal data, granular privacy
settings can be employed to describe what each user is
comfortable with sharing, when they are comfortable sharing it,
and to which types of or with what specific entities these rules
apply. In this way, a system requesting access rights across a
smartphones”).
54. See Joseph Turow et al., The Federal Trade Commission and Consumer
Privacy in the Coming Decade, 3 J.L. & POL'Y FOR INFO. SOC’Y 723, 745 (2008)
(“Under the Federal Trade Commission's notice and choice regime, the operating
assumption is that people will make good choices if they are provided with good
information. Our studies have found that Americans do not have good, i.e., full
and understandable, information about data practices that affect their
privacy.”).
55. See Masooda Bashir et al., supra note 8, at 2 (“Either the user agrees to
give up all their personal information to the service or they choose not to use the
service at all.”).
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broad body of individuals will be required to “play nicely” and
remain sensible and transparent regarding data requests or else
they will find themselves denied access to a majority of potential
users. In popular Privacy-as-a-Service systems, this could prevent
access to millions of users. In short, for the first time in the
history
of
digital
privacy
negotiation
relationships,
Privacy-as-a-Service enforces that the types of data collected
must make sense to the community and the Privacy-as-a-Service
provider, lest the request be wholesale denied. As an additional
benefit, granular control of data sharing provides a path for data
markets or data exchanges to appear whereby a user has the
option to provide specific types of non-crucial additional personal
data to particular requesting entities in return for some tangible
benefit.56 No longer is the privacy negotiation quid pro quo simply
“all of my privacy in return for your service.”
D. A Wiser Use of Privacy Cycles
The last thing consumers should be expected to do is to
increase their time spent on the minutiae of managing privacy.
As a majority of consumers are neither privacy experts nor versed
in legalese, expecting them to fully comprehend a Privacy Policy
or Terms of Service and thereby make an informed choice, is
somewhat absurd. The time an individual spends thinking about
and managing privacy efforts (their “privacy cycles”) would be
better spent researching professional entities with whom they
can trust the management of their privacy. The onus would be on
these private management entities (PMEs) to determine an
individual’s privacy requirements and then provide a
management service layer with which to facilitate the
permissions and data transfer in M2M communication where
privacy payloads are concerned. In other words, an individual
56. See Mark van Rijmenam, Monetizing Your Personal Data: From Data
Ownership
to
Data
Usage,
LINKEDIN
(Sept.
1,
2014),
https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/20140901120954-15537165-monetizing-your-per
sonal-data-from-data-ownership-to-data-usage (last visited Apr. 24, 2017)
(discussing “Big Data startups that are developing personal data marketplaces”
and “empowering consumers to determine what’s done with their data and
receive monetary rewards for the usage of their data”) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
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would give the managing entity the rights to make decisions on
her behalf, such that the distractions and time sensitivity of data
permissions would be abstracted away from her while allowing
her to remain in control of the rules governing privacy decisions.
In this way, the user focus on privacy is extremely efficient and
meets many needs rather than requiring a fragmented and
interruption-driven focus from specific information seeking
entities at time of product or service use.
E. An Audit Trail
An additional requirement of such a Privacy-as-a-Service
ecosystem could be to create a standardized audit trail via
request logging in which each requesting entity must identify
itself with a consistent and public unique user identifying
number (UUID), include an additional unique “request ID” per
request, and explicitly enumerate the types of data requested.
This request information is then written to a local (to the user)
audit log along with a timestamp and location (e.g. GPS). The
Privacy-as-a-Service provider and the individual will then have
full transparency into who has asked for information at what
point in any given journey and what the outcome of that request
was (e.g. what was shared in return). The UUID would be
registered publicly to a responsible and separate neutral third
party in charge of maintaining the identification mapping of
UUIDs to organizations. Additional good-faith functionality that
could increase the likelihood that an entity is considered trusted
by a privacy management service would include the ability to
easily request a personal record of what is known about the user
and automated “right to be forgotten” options such as
programmatic privacy data editing, single entity data erasure, or
complete removal of all information from all known entities. As
such, an engaged individual utilizing Privacy-as-a-Service could
easily retrieve (either from the vehicle or machine that was
utilized or through the Privacy-as-a-Service provider) and
understand all data they have shared at any point with any given
entities as well as request that all or specific personal data be
completely erased in one single command. This audit trail
reduces traditional asymmetry of information issues that users
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experience in modern systems whereby it is difficult or impossible
to understand the who, what, and why regarding their personal
data footprint.57
F. A Managed Service
Privacy-as-a-Service could function in a manner similar to a
virus protection service where a user subscribes to a fee based
service or one managed by a nonprofit organization focused on
privacy principles such as the Fair Information Practice
Principles for privacy (FIPPs). A user could research available
Privacy-as-a-Service providers, subscribe to their service and
create an account, register vehicles or machines that the service
would manage, select privacy configurations for any or all
registered objects (including default settings based on risk
tolerance), and then connect each machine to the service.
Such trusted providers would maintain a database of white
and blacklisted entities for purposes of negotiating the sharing of
privacy data based on users’ configurations with this database
being updated frequently. Organizations who choose not to
register could be summarily denied when making a data request
to any subscriber of that (or any) service. Bad actors that get
blacklisted for not behaving appropriately could have access
rights immediately rescinded (a powerful, crowdsourced trust
revocation function) as Privacy-as-a-Service providers remove
them from their configured whitelists, compelling them to behave
or suffer reduced or fully rejected access rights to a huge
population of users. Never before has the user had the power to
be a part of a managed privacy system that benefits from
multiple sources of input (e.g. other users) in order to collectively
bargain for privacy in a “unionized” way. Akin to reputation
systems in other contexts, the white or blacklisting of given
entities based on the input of many independent “subscribers”
can function to quickly modify offending requestors’ behaviors
and promotes more careful and mindful future behavior on the
part of the requesting entity. No longer would blanket access be
57. See Masooda Bashir et al., supra note 8, at 2 (“Because most users do
not take the time to read and understand privacy disclosures, their
comprehension of service providers’ policies is likely to be low.”).
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acceptable, or nuanced terms buried in a Terms of Service
document suffice. Such a service is a powerful, independent check
on the behavior of requesting parties and can function as a
self-governing system, reducing the need for oversight.
G. Better Protected and More Open With Data
When citizens are comfortable in their privacy choices and
are given the transparency they desire, their sense of control is
increased. There is an argument to be made that this will
actually increase the types of data a citizen is willing to share
with trusted entities due to the comfort and security in knowing
they or a trusted partner can review an audit trail and that their
data can be deleted or modified on command.58 The opportunity to
regain control at any point in time, to realize a mistake, or to
modify one’s choices about any or all aspects of her personal
information is a key missing element in our modern privacy
systems. The consumer should feel a sense of relief and privacy
control when engaging with an established Privacy-as-a-Service
provider, secure in the knowledge that a highly specialized
service is managing her privacy needs. The outcome of this
comfort may be that, in the right circumstances, consumers are
willing to share even more data than they were previously. A
managed privacy service model provides users with the comfort to
share only the data of their choosing with specific responsible and
transparent third parties, who may then have access to in-depth
data that is user-certified as accurate, current, and available for
use—the type of data these parties can only dream of taking
advantage of today. This also broadens innovation possibilities
and could spawn new ecosystems not yet imagined. No longer is
the conversation between a user and the opaque end product.
Instead, a professional service stands in the middle, maintaining
a much-needed balance of power, and providing a constantly
vigilant and mindful approach to the valuable asset—both
monetarily and psychologically—of one’s personal data.

58.

Quint & Rogers, supra note 52.
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H. Current Challenges to Employing Privacy-as-a-Service

Employing an automated privacy management service in
V2V communications is not without its challenges, and may
require specific adjustments or agreements on key
interpretations of legislature such as the GDPR.59 For example,
the requirement of a “clear affirmative act” must be understood to
include a preconfigured or algorithmic rule set. The concepts of
users making “informed” and “specific” agreements as a part of
consent also may be considered challenging in an automated
approach.60 These challenges, however, are surmountable if it is
interpreted that the consumer, through careful configuration of
her personal privacy policy regarding consent is merely
abstracting the choices she would otherwise make to an
automated system.
As mentioned in Part I of this paper, current settings in a
web service apply this functionality regarding acceptance of
tracking cookies, though, recently, many websites ask for explicit
user agreement as well. As methods of the communication of
private data change, the industry must take a best effort
approach to respecting and enabling all phases of the privacy
lifecycle: consent acquisition, appropriate data use, review,
revocation and editing options. So long as this remains true,
current (and near future) privacy law may be interpreted to allow
for a configured Privacy-as-a-Service system. If such
interpretation is not possible, it is believed that ideas around
automating and managing consent can be used as guides for the
improvement of future privacy laws in a world where “privacy
payloads” become ubiquitous and interaction and decision times
may be reduced to milliseconds.
VI. Conclusion: Control, Transparency and Improved Opportunity
Privacy is about control of personal information, and today’s
approaches to privacy management, originating from analog
interactions, no longer fit with the realities of rapidly evolving
59. Recital 32 of the GDPR is one example. Council Regulation 2016/679,
supra note 21, at L 119/6.
60. Id.
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digital services. Terms of Service are overly complex and
voluminous and so are rarely read and understood by the average
user. Future advanced services, which promise additional levels
of abstraction and complexity, also demand a need for a more
tenable approach to privacy management. As time goes on, and
current systems are built on outdated underpinnings, the
paradigm of digital privacy becomes a convoluted system of
court-ordered restrictions, illusions of user control, and feeds into
a public paranoia over the lack of understanding about what
personal data a shady and rarely understood “they” are collecting
and what “they” are doing with it. A sense of defeat becomes a
common response for a public that simply wants to interact in the
digital communication economy. The complexity and obfuscation
of today’s consent systems for sharing private information are a
result of organic evolution and adaptation rather than a planned
and controlled holistic approach to privacy outcomes.
In the short term, to enable V2V, V2I, or any other M2M
communications with privacy payloads in a high frequency or
even a constant stream, the requirements for valid informed
consent in a dynamic and communication based mobility
ecosystem need to be more generally applicable. A suitable and
user-friendly solution is the device (vehicle) configuration stage,
where a driver can choose, or opt-in, connectivity functions and,
thus, grant consent based on a level of transparency similar to
“accept all third party cookies” as a comparable setting to control
the flow of information to and from a device. But, in the longer
term, especially as the age of V2V and M2M communication is
upon us, this methodology will need to improve.
As such, a new approach is called for. This approach must be
fair, must return the power of privacy to the consumer, and not
be used as a tool of coercion for common service use. This
approach should meet the needs of the user first, but also allow
for a robust ecosystem of information sharing in order to improve
our world by enabling innovation, make living easier, and make
lives more enjoyable. The solution must also fit easily into a
world in which multitudes of permissioned communications are
occurring at a rate that is beyond the power of an individual to
react to in a meaningful manner. If such an approach is not
taken, we will soon come upon a point of “privacy fatigue” (if we
are not already there) in which a user’s privacy management
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becomes little more than background noise; not because it is
unimportant, but because the user can no longer bear to expend
the time needed to meaningfully manage her permissions and the
allowances made to the long list of requestors. Such a reality is
an unfair outcome, a failure of a system, and a nightmare for
privacy. We believe that a future that will incorporate large
numbers of M2M communication use cases requires a more open
and easily managed permissions system than exists today. This
system must, however, first be in line with the user’s needs and
rights.
The future of digital privacy depends on returning control to
the user in a respectful, sane, and manageable way that is
tailored to the realities of new advanced services, with a
sensitivity for the expected burdens of privacy management. A
user should not be forced to trade undue amounts of time and
effort in order to preserve privacy. By the same token, control of
privacy must be returned to the user and made easier for them,
lest the courts and regulators step in and tighten the regulations
at the cost of innovation and economic opportunities. A balance
must be struck, and users must be protected and in control.
Privacy-as-a-Service—an independently managed method of
granular privacy control—can meet the needs of both the
individual user and the industry at large. By algorithmically
maintaining privacy functions through whitelists, blacklists,
complex situational settings and real-time updates, the user can
inherit the privacy expertise of a crowd-sourced and
professionally managed service. A robust audit trail can provide
an additional level of security, allowing users to feel comfortable
in their privacy configuration choices and the choices they have
shifted to the privacy management service. Any discomfort at the
realization that unwanted actors or unwanted information has
been shared can be addressed through the provided opportunity
for immediate revocation, update of configuration, and removal of
offending data from the collector. Due to this, data collectors will
behave in transparent, ethical manners since their rights to
access personal data are at risk at all times, contingent on their
behaving ethically.
In addition to the ease of audit that compels data collectors to
behave and be mindful of the data they collect, the power of a
managed service is further enhanced by the critical mass of
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subscribers it maintains. A bad or abusive actor in a managed
system is not only blacklisted by the person experiencing the
abuse, but may be added to the blacklist pool inherited by all
subscribers with those particular settings. As such, industries are
kept in check regarding the types of data they collect and are
forced to justify this collection at risk of losing access to some or
all information from a critical mass of users. This mechanism
acts as a governor of sorts, and can be adjusted over time as new
industries are created, allowing for adaptation within the defined
system such that new and unimagined ecosystems are allowed to
flourish.
While the net benefits seen by such a system of managed
privacy are difficult to quantify, it is believed that by giving users
a greater sense of true control over their private data through the
inclusion of a professionally managed service, an audit trail,
crowdsourced and automatic updates, and choice at whatever
granularity they choose, consumers will be far more comfortable
sharing additional data with trusted entities. As long as the
trusted actors remain trusted, more data will be shared and
available for the development of ever-more innovative services. If
this trust relationship changes through an inherited change from
the managed system or through the opinion of the individual, a
simple process takes place: preferences are updated, permissions
revoked, and users will demand that their data be deleted. The
opportunity to expand the types of data gathered as the markets,
society, and privacy attitudes change represents a bold new
approach to an age old topic: how to maintain users’ control of
their privacy while allowing them to exist within their modern
world. Privacy-as-a-Service meets this need, is adaptive to the
future’s next challenges, and represents an answer to the data
sharing and permission onslaught we expect to see in emerging
M2M technologies such as V2V communication. Such a solution
maintains, expands, and increases the value of personal data
while preserving privacy, not through applying an algorithmic
obfuscation to a current framework, but rather through a more
basic and fundamental approach. By redefining the way in which
privacy interactions occur and the relationship between the user
and the requesting entity, we provide a way forward in which
privacy is maintained while innovation is allowed to continue
(mostly) unfettered.

